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1 Introduction
Environmental policy gives polluting …rms an incentive to …nd cleaner ways of producing.
There is a large literature on the e¤ect of environmental policy on innovation (see e.g.
Requate (2005) for an overview) starting from Kneese and Schultze (1978). One question
that has received relatively little attention until recently is: When environmental policy
becomes stricter and stricter, will …rms use ever cleaner production methods? Our imme-
diate intuition might suggest that this should be the case. However, making production
cleaner is only one of two ways in which a …rm can respond to stricter environmental pol-
icy. The other way is to reduce output. This in turn may reduce …rms’ incentives to clean
up production: If a …rm will produce very little because of a very strict environmental
policy, it also has little incentive to spend on abatement. This suggests that when out-
put is decreasing in the strictness of environmental policy, the emissions-to-output ratio
might be a U-shaped function of strictness. However, the e¤ects might conceivably also
be reversed: When an ever stricter environmental policy prompts a …rm to spend more
and more on cleaner production methods, production might eventually become so clean
that it starts to increase again.
So far, the economic literature has established that the rate of clean technology adop-
tion can be U-shaped in the strictness of environmental policy (Perino and Requate, 2012;
Bréchet and Meunier, 2014), a result which is qualitatively similar (although at an ag-
gregate level) to the …rst of the e¤ects mentioned above. We show that the second e¤ect
may also arise: It is possible for the strictness of the policy to have a non-linear e¤ect
on output, instead of on the emission-to-output ratio. In this paper we also shed light
on the circumstances under which each of these e¤ects arise. We …nd that the …rst (sec-
ond) e¤ect is associated with low (high) pro…tability conditions. Our results suggest that
the policy-maker should be aware of the potential interaction between environmental and
industrial policies that could lead to lower abatement incentives in an industry.
The non-linear e¤ects described above appear when …rms have an integrated abate-
ment technology at their disposal. This is a technology that allows …rms to reduce the
emission intensity of their production to a certain level. In our model, we will consider
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that …rms have at their disposal this type of technology.1 Examples of integrated tech-
nologies are modi…cations to the design of the combustion chamber and technologies that
allow …rms to use more environmentally friendly materials or to switch to a fuel with a
lower emission factor (Frondel et al., 2007). For instance in the steel and iron industry, one
of the largest industrial sources of CO2 emissions, coal can be replaced by wood charcoal
or even biomass (Carpenter, 2012).
Perino and Requate (2012) analyze the adoption of an integrated abatement technology
in a market with a continuum of small …rms. The …rms choose between a clean and a
dirty technology. In this setting, the number of …rms adopting the cleaner technology is
non-monotonic in the strictness of the environmental policy. Bréchet and Meunier (2014)
consider the output market more explicitly than Perino and Requate (2012). Otherwise
their model is similar, also …nding that the share of …rms adopting the clean technology
is inverted U-shaped in the strictness of environmental policy.2
The crucial di¤erence between our paper and the previous contributions lies in the
type of choice available to …rms. Perino and Requate (2012) and Bréchet and Meunier
(2014) assume that …rms face a discrete choice between a clear and a dirty technology.
In contrast, in our model abatement is a continuous variable. In other words, rather
than being a model of adoption of a clean technology, our model analyzes the decision by
individual …rms on how much to spend on abatement. It is important to notice that this
is not merely a matter of interpretation of the model. In fact, considering a continuous
decision in abatement yields a richer set of results than found in the previous literature.
As mentioned above, the non-linear e¤ects of the strictness of the environmental e¤ect
may not arise in emission intensities, they may appear in the levels of output instead.
As Perino and Requate (2012) have shown, the non-monotonic e¤ect of the strictness
of the environmental policy on the rate of adoption of cleaner technologies is linked to the
1By contrast, an end-of-pipe technology allows for the reduction of emissions by an absolute amount
(e.g. Requate, 2005; Endres and Friehe, 2013; Lahiri and Symeonidis, 2017; Menezes and Pereira, 2017).
Solving our model with an end-of-pipe technology, we …nd that both emission intensity and output are
decreasing in the strictness of the policy. The analysis is available upon request.
2In a setting where consumers are environmentally aware and …rms compete à la Cournot, Gil-Moltó
and Varvarigos (2013) show that the bene…ts of adopting a clean technology are initially increasing and
then decreasing in the emission tax, with the turning point occurring at lower tax rates when consumers’
environmental awareness is stronger.
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recent literature on pivoting Marginal Abatement Costs () curves. Traditionally it
has been assumed that environmental innovation reduces  at any level of emissions.
In these models, a stricter environmental policy leads to more environmental innovation
(e.g. Downing and White, 1986; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Jung et al., 1996; Requate
and Unold, 2003). A number of papers (Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman et
al., 2008; Bréchet and Jouvet, 2008) have shown that an environmental innovation may
not cause the whole  curve to shift downward. Indeed, Amir et al. (2008), Bauman
et al. (2008) and Bréchet and Jouvet (2008) show that a decrease in the marginal emission
intensity of "dirty" inputs leads to a clockwise rotation or pivoting of the  curve: it
is lower for higher emission levels, but higher for lower emission levels.3 While these three
papers take the output response of a …rm into account, they do so in a very simpli…ed
manner, as they only consider one …rm faced with a constant output price. In addition to
the constant price scenario, we will also consider the case of strategic interaction (Cournot
oligopoly) and perfect competition.
Interestingly, there is also an earlier literature that explicitly takes the output market
into account when considering …rms’ incentives to spend on abatement.4 In a free-entry
Cournot oligopoly model with constant marginal production cost and an integrated abate-
ment technology, Ulph (1997) derives conditions under which an increase in the tax rate
reduces output, …nding that the e¤ect of the tax rate on environmental R&D is ambigu-
ous. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) set up a Cournot oligopoly with technology
spillovers, where the government taxes emissions and subsidizes environmental R&D. The
authors’ conclusion that the e¤ect of the tax rate on output is ambiguous is in accordance
with Ulph’s (1997) …ndings. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) further …nd that R&D
spending is increasing in the tax rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model.
In Section 3, we solve the model under fairly general conditions. In fact, our solutions
will encapsulate the cases of strategic interaction (Cournot oligopoly), constant price, as
3Endres and Friehe (2011) examine the e¤ects of environmental liability law on the incentives to di¤use
advanced abatement technology that reduces  everywhere or pivots the  curve clockwise.
4A related research strand focuses on abatement spending in the context of international trade, showing
the ambiguous e¤ect of domestic emission taxation (Simpson and Bradford, 1996; Ulph and Ulph, 1996;
Feess and Muehlheusser, 2002; Greaker, 2003).
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well as perfect competition (we relegate the analysis of the latter case to the appendix
for expositional purposes). In Section 4, we will employ speci…c functional forms to
identify under which circumstances the non-monotonic e¤ects of the stringency of the
environmental policy occur in either output levels or emission intensitities. In this section
we will also derive and discuss the behaviour of the  curves. In order to show that
the non-monotonic e¤ects of the strictness of the policy are not due to policy failure,
the appendix applies the analysis from Sections 3 and 4 to the social optimum, where
both abatement and output levels are set to maximize welfare. In Section 5, we discuss
our results and how they …t with the literature. The concluding Section 6 discusses the
implications for policy and empirical work.
2 The model
There are   0 identical …rms producing a homogeneous good. Firm   = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢  
producing  faces the inverse demand function  (), where  is the product price,
 ´ P=1   0() · 0 and
 0() +  00() · 0 (1)
Our analysis will encompass the scenarios of a constant product price ( 0 = 0), perfect
competition ( 0  0 and a continuum of …rms of mass ) and oligopolistic (Cournot)
competition ( 0  0 small ). While the constant  scenario may seem rather unrealistic,
it is worth analyzing for the following reasons. First, it is the easiest to analyze, because
there are no interactions between …rms through the output market. Secondly, it maintains
the standard assumption in the literature5 that a …rm’s marginal abatement cost only
depends on its own technology choice, and not on any variable chosen by other …rms.
The only way to maintain this assumption with integrated technology is to assume that
 is constant, as Amir et al. (2008), Bauman et al. (2008) and Bréchet and Jouvet (2008)
have done explicitly. Finally, this scenario serves to highlight the crucial similarities and
di¤erences between our model and those in the previous literature. Perino and Requate
(2012) do not model the output market explicitly, but assume that a …rm’s  only
5For instance Downing and White (1986), Jung et al. (1996), Milliman and Prince (1989), Requate
and Unold (2003), among many others.
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depends on its own technology choice. Thus, they implicitly assume constant  They also
assume that the choice of technology is discrete. Bréchet and Meunier (2014) do model
the output market explicitly, but assume a discrete choice of technology like Perino and
Requate (2012). In our case, we consider a continuous choice of abatement options and
both constant price, perfect competition and strategic interaction.
Production is polluting. Firm ’s total (net) emissions  are given by:
 =  (2)
where  2 [0 1] is the emissions-to-output ratio, which depends on the …rm’s abatement
decision. We normalize  to one for the case where there is no abatement
We shall assume that …rms can use an integrated abatement technology. Following
Ulph (1997), a …rm wanting to reduce its emission-to-output ratio to  with an integrated
technology has to spend an amount  (). The …rm’s cost function is:
( ) = () +  () (3)
with 0(0) = 0; 0  0 and 00  0 for   0;  0(1) = 0;  0()  0 and  00()  0 for
 2 [0 1)
The environmental damage caused by pollution is given by () where  ´P
=1  ( 0) = ( 0) = 0   0 and   0 for   0; (0 ) = (0 ) =
0   0 and   0 for   0 Thus total and marginal damage are increasing in the
environmental damage parameter This parameter measures the severity of the environ-
mental problem or the strength of the policy maker’s preference for the environment.6
The game we analyze in this paper is as follows. In stage one, the regulator sets the
environmental tax rate  that maximizes welfare. Welfare consists of consumer utility
(the area below the inverse demand curve) minus …rms’ costs and environmental damage.
We will only consider symmetric equilibria where  =  and  = . In a symmetric
equilibrium, welfare is, from (2) and (3):
 (  ) =
Z 
0
 ( ) ¡  [() +  ()]¡( ) (4)
6When analyzing emission taxation under imperfect competition, we will assume that  is high enough
to guarantee a positive tax rate (  0). For small  the regulator would set   0 to induce the
imperfectly competitive …rms to produce more.
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In stage two, each …rm chooses its abatement and output levels simultaneously to
maximize its pro…ts.7 Firm ’s pro…ts are, from (2) and (3):
¦ = ¦( ) =  () ¡ ()¡  ()¡  (5)
We are ultimately interested in the e¤ect of an increase in the environmental dam-
age parameter  via  on output and abatement. Thus (as we shall see) the stricter
environmental policy follows endogenously from an increase in 
3 General analysis
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of changes in the environmental damage parame-
ter and the tax rate on the equilibrium levels of output and abatement under Cournot
oligopoly and the constant-price scenario. We will use Cournot as the benchmark case.
The analysis of the constant price scenario can be obtained from the expressions in this
section by setting to zero all terms containing  0 and  00 The case of perfect competition
is relegated to Appendix A for expositional purposes. All three cases yield qualitatively
similar results.
In stage two of the game presented in Section 2, …rm  sets the output level  and
emission intensity  to maximize its pro…ts (5). The …rst order conditions (henceforth
FOCs) are, respectively:
 +  0() ¡ 0()¡  = 0 (6)
¡ 0()¡  = 0 (7)
The Hessian matrix is:
¦ ´
µ
2 0 +  00 ¡ 00 ¡
¡ ¡ 00
¶
(8)
7One could argue that the abatement choice is a relatively long-term and irreversible decision. There-
fore, alternative plausible timings could feature abatement being chosen before output or even before the
regulator sets the tax rate. Under imperfect competition, …rms would then choose their abatement levels
strategically. The analysis of the e¤ects of alternative timings falls outside the scope of the present paper
but could constitute an interesting avenue for further research.
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Note that ¡ 00  0 and 2 0 +  00 ¡ 00  0 by (1) and 00  0.8 Therefore, in this
case, ¦ is negative de…nite as long as
(2 0 +  00 ¡ 00)(¡ 00)¡ 2  0 (9)
which is therefore su¢cient second order condition (henceforth SOC) for maximization in
this case.
We can characterize the e¤ect of  on the equilibrium levels of output and abatement
by totally di¤erentiating the FOCs with respect to  and solving the system:


=
¡ 00 + 
[00 ¡ (+ 1) 0 ¡  00] 00 ¡ 2 (10)


=
 [(+ 1)
0 +  00 ¡ 00] + 
[00 ¡ (+ 1) 0 ¡  00] 00 ¡ 2 (11)
Note that the term in the denominator is positive given  00  0, (1) and (9). The
signs of (10) and (11) are thus the signs of the numerators on the respective RHSs.
Interestingly, at  = 0, (10) and (11) yield:


=
¡
00 ¡ (+ 1) 0 ¡  00  0


=
 [(+ 1)
0 +  00 ¡ 00]
[00 ¡ (+ 1) 0 ¡  00] 00  0
Thus when environmental policy is very lenient (the emission tax rate is close to zero),
an increase in the tax rate induces …rms to reduce emissions by lowering their level of
output as well as their emission-to-output ratio.
For higher values of , the signs of (10) and (11) become ambiguous. However, we can
establish that emissions are strictly decreasing in the tax rate. From (2), (10) and (11):


= 


+ 


=
¡2 00 + 2+ 2 [(+ 1) 0 +  00 ¡ 00]
[00 ¡ (+ 1) 0 ¡  00] 00 ¡ 2  0 (12)
To explain the inequality, note that as before, the denominator in (12) is positive.
Using (8), the numerator can be written as:
¡
 
¢
¦
µ


¶
+ (¡ 1)2 ( 0 +  00)  0
8While 00 ¸ 0 combined with (1) is su¢cient for 2 0 + 00¡00  0 to hold under Cournot oligopoly,
00  0 is necessary for the constant-price scenario.
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where the inequality follows from (1) and setting h =
¡
 
¢
in h¦h0  0 because
¦ is negative de…nite.
Now that we have established that emissions are decreasing in , we can anticipate that
when  is su¢ciently large (that is, when the environmental policy is su¢ciently strict),
emissions will be very low (that is,  =  ! 0)9 This may be due to either  or 
approaching zero. Let us …rst consider the case when  approaches zero. From (10):


¯¯¯¯
!0
=

[00 ¡ (+ 1) 0 ¡  00] 00 ¡ 2  0
Thus, when  is decreasing towards zero for ever stricter environmental policy, 
is increasing in the emission tax rate.10 Now let us consider the case where output
approaches zero. In this case, (11) becomes:


¯¯¯¯
!0
=

[00 ¡ (+ 1) 0] 00 ¡ 2  0
Thus, when  is decreasing towards zero for ever stricter environmental policy,  is
increasing. Indeed from (7) with  ! 0  approaches unity again: The …rm does not
spend anything on reducing the emissions-to-output ratio when output is very low.
In stage 1, the regulator sets the emission tax rate  that maximizes welfare. Writing
welfare (4) as a function of  and , the …rst order condition with respect to  is:
 ( )

= 


¡ 0

¡  0

¡ 

= 0 (13)
Using the implicit function theorem we …nd:


= ¡
2
22
= 

22
 0 (14)
The second equality follows from (13). The inequality follows from   0  
0 by (12) and 22  0 as the SOC for welfare maximization. Thus an increase in 
will prompt the regulator to raise the tax rate. This means that the signs of  and
 are the signs of  and  respectively.
Intuitively, one might think that a regulator who has become more concerned about
environmental damage might be wary of increasing the emission tax rate, because it could
9We assume that in this case, second order condition (9) still holds even with a large . In Section 4,
we will check whether this is indeed the case for the speci…c functional forms that we use.
10Indeed from (6) with  ! 0  approaches the output level without environmental policy.
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result in more production or more polluting production methods. However, we show that
the regulator will still increase the tax rate, because a higher tax rate reduces emissions
in spite of any increase in output or emission intensity.
Summarizing our results, we can state the following:11
Proposition 1 In the constant-price and Cournot oligopoly scenarios, when …rms have
access to an integrated abatement technology with a continuous range of emission inten-
sities :
1. The tax rate  is increasing in the environmental damage parameter ;
2. Emissions  are decreasing in , and consequently in ;
3. When  is very low, both output  and emission intensity  are decreasing in  and
in ;
4. When  is very high so that  is close to zero:
(a) When  is close to zero,  is increasing in  and in 
(b) When  is close to zero,  is increasing in  and in 
This proposition implies that, when we consider a continuous abatement technology,
the e¤ect of the strictness of the policy (here captured by the emissions tax rate), or
indeed the underlying environmental damage parameter, is non-monotonic in either the
level of output or in abatement under the di¤erent types of competition considered in
this paper. That is, considering a continuous abatement technology (instead of a discrete
technology choice as in Perino and Requate (2012) and Bréchet and Meunier (2014))
allows us to obtain a richer set of results, in the sense that the non-linearities in the
e¤ects of the stringency of the environmental policy may arise in output levels instead of
emission intensity levels, as part 4 of the proposition states.12 These results apply under
11We have also worked with a more general cost function. We found that with emission taxation as
well as in the social optimum, emissions  are decreasing in the environmental damage parameter .
Furthermore, when  is very low, both output  and emission intensity  are decreasing in  Details are
available from the corresponding author upon request.
12The non-monotonic e¤ect of strictness on output levels is also in contrast with Ulph’s (1997) …ndings
for integrated technologies. We discuss the reason for this divergence in Appendix C
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the three types of competition considered in our paper. In order to shed more light on
the circumstances under which each of the two scenarios (non-monotonicities in output
vs non-monotonicities in emission intensities) will materialise, we need to place more
restrictions on the cost functions. We will undertake this analysis in the next section.
4 Example
We know from the previous Section that either output  or the emission-to-output ratio
 must be non-monotonic in the tax rate. In order to shed some light on the conditions
under which either scenario prevails, we have to assume speci…c functional forms for the
cost function and the demand function.
In this section, we will assume that each …rm ’s cost function is given by the following
speci…cation of the general integrated-technology cost function (3):
( ) =

2
2 +

2
(1¡ )2    0 (15)
First, we shall solve the game with constant product price  in subsection 4.1. In
subsection 4.2, we analyze the case where …rms interact strategically in the output market
(Cournot oligopoly),13 where price decreases in total production  according to:
 = ¡ (16)
with    for positive output.14 Our speci…c functions here satisfy all the restrictions
imposed upon them in Section 2. The case of perfect competition with speci…c functional
forms is relegated to Appendix A.2.
4.1 Constant product price
In this subsection we consider the case where the product price is constant, denoting this
scenario by the subscript . Since there are no interactions between …rms, we can focus
on the behaviour of a single …rm that sets output  and emission intensity  facing the
constant product price  and an emission tax rate  Its emissions are given by (2) and
13We provide the general solution to the two scenarios, along with the formal proof, in Appendix B.
14The analogous condition for the case with constant price is   .
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its cost function by (15). The …rm maximizes its pro…ts ¦, consisting of operating pro…ts
( ) minus the tax bill:
max ¦ = ( )¡  =  ¡ 
2
2 ¡ 
2
(1¡ )2 ¡  (17)
The …rst order conditions are, with respect to  and  respectively:
 ¡  ¡  = 0 (18)
(1¡ )¡  = 0 (19)
Solving the above system for  and  yields:15
 =
( ¡ )
 ¡ 2   =
 ¡ 
 ¡ 2   =
 ( ¡ ) ( ¡ )
( ¡ 2)2 (20)
When  = 0 the …rm’s output, emissions and operating pro…ts are given by:
 = ¹ ´ 

  = ¹  = ¹ ´ 
2
2
(21)
Applying Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 from Appendix B, we see that when    2
emission intensity is monotonically decreasing in  and output is U-shaped in  with the
turning point at  = 1
2
 Intuitively, when production is very clean (to be precise: when the
emissions-to-output ratio is below half the no-regulation level), output levels can increase
again with the tax rate while becoming ever cleaner.
If    2 output is monotonically decreasing in  and emission intensity is U-shaped
in  with the turning point at:
~ ´ ¹
2
=

2
(22)
Thus  decreases until the point where output is so low that it is no longer worthwhile
to deploy cleaner production methods. From (22), this point is where output is at half
its no-regulation level of ¹ de…ned in (21)16
Intuitively, when    2 production and abatement costs are low relative to the
product price (there are high pro…tability conditions). As  increases, the …rm is keen
15The numerators on the RHS of the  and  equations are the equivalent of second order condition
(9). They are positive by Proposition 3.3 in Appendix B.
16Due to space constraints, we omit discussion of the knife-edge case (here:  =  2) here and in the
next subsection. We brie‡y discuss the knife-edge case in Appendix B.
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to take advantage of its low emission intensity to let output increase again. This means
that it has to keep reducing its emission intensity as  rises but the …rm is happy to do
so as abatement is relatively cheap. When    2 production and abatement costs
are relatively high compared to the product price (there are low pro…tability conditions).
Then the …rm does not want to produce too much or spend too much on abatement. Thus
as  keeps increasing, the …rm keeps reducing emissions by decreasing output rather than
by reducing its emission intensity. When output has fallen below ~ in (22), the …rm can
allow itself to increase its emission intensity again.
Let us now interpret this result in terms of Marginal Abatement Costs (). We
follow the approach by Amir et al. (2008), Bauman et al. (2008) and Bréchet and Jouvet
(2008) who build upon McKitrick’s (1999) de…nition of the  function for a given
level of emission intensity ( in our model). Substituting (2) into (17), operating pro…ts
can be written as a function of emissions and emission intensity:
( ) =


¡ 
2
³

´2
¡ 
2
(1¡ )2
Marginal abatement costs, de…ned for a given level of  are then:
( ) ´ ( )

=


¡ 
2
(23)
The …rm sets  =  When  = 0 the …rm sets  = 0 so that  = ¹ and
 = ¹ ¡ 2 (1¡ )2 with ¹ and ¹ given by (21). On the other hand, unless  = 0 zero
emissions ( = 0) can only be achieved by setting  = 0 which implies  = ¡
2
(1¡)2 We
can now determine the e¤ect of decreasing  on the  curve. A decrease in  shifts
the horizontal intercept ¹ = ¹ to the left. The area under the  curve must remain
the same, because it is the di¤erence ¹ in pro…ts between  = 0 and  =  = 0
(Bauman et al., 2008, p. 513). This means that the vertical intercept (0 ) has to
move up according to:
(0 ) =
2¹
¹
=


Figure 1 shows  curves for di¤erent levels of  when  =  = 117 The lower
is  the closer to the origin is the point where  = 0 the higher is the vertical
17The Figure only shows the  curves for  ·  = 1 since by Proposition 3 and (B2),  = 0 is
achieved for  =  =  =  when    2 = 1 and for  =  =  = 1 when    2 = 1.
For the same reason, Figures 4 and 6 only show the vertical axis between 0 and 1.
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Figure 1: Marginal Abatement Cost () curves for di¤erent values of emission inten-
sity  ( =  = 1)
intercept and the steeper is the curve. This means that any  curve for a given 
value intersects every other  curve.
Intuitively, a decrease in emission intensity  has two e¤ects on marginal abatement
costs  as a function of emissions . First, a lower  means that output  has to
be reduced further to achieve a given emission reduction. This e¤ect raises  and is
dominant for low levels of  Secondly, a lower  means that a given level of  is achieved
with a higher . With increasing marginal production costs, the pro…t margin on the last
unit of output, which has to be given up in order to reduce  is lower when  is lower
and  is higher. This second e¤ect reduces  and is dominant for high levels of .
When  falls marginally, the  curve pivots clockwise around its middle point, so
that the area underneath remains constant at ¹ given by (21).18 Since  = 0 at
 = ¹ the pivot point is at:
 = ~ ´ 
2
=
1
2
¹ = ~ (24)
18Formally, the pivot point is found by setting  = 0 in (23).
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Figure 2: Emissions as a function of the tax rate for di¤erent values of  ( =  = 1)
The pivot point is thus at  = ~ de…ned in (22) as the output level where  reaches
the bottom of its U-shaped curve. Substituting (24) back into (23) to eliminate , we can
…nd the curve that connects all these pivot points, which is the envelope curve  () that
gives the maximum value of  for a given level of :
 () =
 2
4
(25)
Figure 1 shows the envelope curve  () for  =  = 1.
Figure 2 shows emissions  in (20) as a function of the tax rate for  =  = 1 and
di¤erent values of  (note that the axes are interchanged compared to Figure 1). When
   2 = 1 (that is, under low pro…tability conditions)  is monotonically decreasing
in  and  is U-shaped in  reaching its minimum at  = ~ given by (22). In Figure 2,
the point where  reaches its minimum is where the emissions curve touches the  = ~
curve. This curve is the inverse of the  () curve in (25) and Figure 1.
When    2 = 1 (that is, under high pro…tability conditions)  is monotonically
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decreasing in  and  is U-shaped in  reaching its minimum at  = 1
2
 Solving  = 1
2
for  and substituting this into the expression for  in (20) we …nd that the point where
 reaches its minimum is given by  = (2 ¡ )4. This is the line " = 1
2
" in Figure
2. The emission curves for    2 = 1 feature decreasing  above the  = 1
2
line and
increasing  below it.19
One might worry that when a cleaner technology shifts the  curve upwards for
low levels of emissions (let us call this the "perverse response" range of emissions), the
regulator would respond to the arrival of a cleaner technology by allowing the …rm to
increase emissions (Bauman et al., 2008, p. 517). Figure 2 illustrates why this does not
happen in our model where technology is endogenous.20 When    2 the emission
path in Figure 2 never reaches the  = ~ curve where the  curves cross. This means
that emissions never reach the perverse response range. In this case, emission intensity
keeps decreasing in the strictness of environmental policy, and output is U-shaped. When
   2 instead, emissions do reach the perverse response range. However, in this
case the industry’s response to stricter environmental policy is to use a more polluting
technology and to reduce output. In both cases, a stricter environmental policy always
results in lower emissions (Proposition 1.2).
4.2 Cournot oligopoly
We now consider the case of a Cournot oligopoly, denoted by subscript . There are 
…rms facing inverse demand function (16). From (2), (15) and (16), pro…ts are:
¦ = ( )¡  = (¡) ¡ 
2
2 ¡

2
(1¡ )2 ¡  (26)
The FOCs for pro…t maximization are, with respect to  and  respectively:
¡ (2 + ) ¡¡ ¡  = 0 (27)
(1¡ )¡  = 0 (28)
19The emission curves for   1 also intersect the  = 12 line, but this is irrelevant for   1
20Similar arguments can be made for Cournot oligopoly in the next subsection.
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Figure 3: Symmetric market equilibrium under Cournot oligopoly
Solving (27) and (28), the symmetric equilibrium solutions ( =   = ) are:
 =
(¡ )
(1 + + )¡ 2   =
(1 + + )¡ 
(1 + + )¡ 2   =
(¡ ) [(1 + + )¡ ]
[(1 + + )¡ 2]2
(29)
The numerators on the RHS are positive by Proposition 3.3 in Appendix B. However,
as we shall see in our numerical examples, the equivalent of second order condition (9):
(2 + )¡ 2  0 (30)
does not hold for all values of   and 
Without environmental policy,  = 0 so that:
 = ¹ ´ 
1 + + 
  = ¹  = ¹ ´ 
2 (2 + )
2 (1 + + )2
(31)
Figure 3 illustrates the symmetric equilibrium, where (27) becomes:
¡ (+ 1)

=


+  (32)
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The LHS is each …rm’s equilibrium marginal revenue (¤ in Figure 3) where all
…rms produce the same amount  =  The RHS of (32) is the sum of the industry’s
aggregate marginal production costs  ( in Figure 3) and the e¤ective tax rate
 ´  on output. When  = 0 (32) holds at point  in Figure 3 so that each …rm sets
 = ¹ as given by (31), total production is ¹ = ¹ and the product price is ¹ =  ( ¹)
by (16). Let us assume that for a given emission intensity level 0 (not shown in the …gure),
the regulator sets the emission tax rate at 0 so that the e¤ective tax rate on output is
 0 ´ 00 and the industry produces 0 as shown in Figure 3. Thus  creates a wedge
between ¤ and  As  rises continuously from zero to  to reduce output per
…rm from ¹ to zero, the continuum of wedges …lls the whole area  = 12
¹ between
¤ and .
Applying Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 from Appendix B and de…ning:
 ´
2
1 +  + 
(33)
we see that when    emission intensity is monotonically decreasing in  and output
is U-shaped in  with the turning point at  = 1
2
 Intuitively, when output is very clean
(to be precise: when the emissions-to-output ratio is below half the no-regulation level),
output can increase again with the tax rate while production is becoming ever cleaner. If
   output is monotonically decreasing in  and emission intensity is U-shaped in 
with the turning point at:
~ ´ 
2(1 + + )
=
¹
2
(34)
Thus,  decreases until the point where output is so low that it is no longer worthwhile
to clean up production further. This occurs when output is at half its no-regulation level
of ¹ given by (31)
The intuition behind  in (33) being the critical value of  is similar to the intuition
highlighted in the previous subsection regarding the pro…tability conditions associated to
each scenario. When    abatement costs , production costs  and the number of
…rms  are low relative to the size of the market . These circumstances are associated
with higher pro…tability conditions. Abatement costs are relatively low for two reasons.
First, each …rm’s cost of reducing emission intensity to a certain level is low, because
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 is low. Secondly, since the number  of …rms is low, each …rm has a relatively high
production level. This raises the bene…t of reducing the emission intensity of output.
As  keeps increasing, …rms are keen to take advantage of their low emission intensity
to let output increase again. This means that they have to keep reducing their emission
intensity as  rises but they are happy to do so as abatement is relatively cheap. When
   abatement costs , production costs  and the number of …rms  are high relative
to the size of the market . This implies that there are low pro…tability conditions. Then
…rms do not want to produce too much or spend too much on abatement. Thus as  keeps
increasing, …rms keep decreasing their output. When output is getting very low, …rms
can increase their emission intensities again.
Let us now interpret these results in terms of marginal abatement cost () curves.
Substituting (2) into (26), …rm ’s pro…ts can be written as a function of emissions,
emission intensity and the aggregate output ¡ of all other …rms:
(  ¡) =
µ
¡¡ ¡ 

¶


¡ 
2
µ


¶2
¡ 
2
(1¡ )2
Firm ’s marginal abatement costs, de…ned for a given level of  are then:
(  ¡) ´ (  ¡)

=
µ
¡¡ ¡ 2

¶
1

¡ 
2
(35)
Unlike in (23) previously with constant product price, …rm ’s  now depends on
the choice of  by all other …rms  6=  These  are endogenous, because they depend
on  We will make use of the aggregate marginal abatement cost  for the whole
industry in a symmetric equilibrium where  =  and  =  (and thus  =  and
 = ) for all  = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢   From (35):
( ) ´ 
µ


 
(¡ 1)

¶
=


¡ (1 + + )
2
(36)
When  = 0 each …rm sets  = 0 so that  = ¹ ´ ¹ as de…ned by (31)
Unless  = 0  = 0 can only be achieved by setting  = 0 A decrease in  shifts the
point ¹ ´  ¹ where  = 0 to the left. The area under the  curve must
remain the same, because it is the area  = 1
2
 ¹ …lled by the wedges of  in Figure
3, as discussed above. This means that (0 ) has to move up according to:
(0 ) =


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Figure 4: Aggregate Marginal Abatement Cost () curves for di¤erent values of
emission intensity  ( =  = 1  = 4)
Figure 4 shows  curves for di¤erent levels of  when  =  = 1  = 4 so that
 in (33) equals
1
6

When  falls marginally, the  curve pivots clockwise around its middle point,
so that the area underneath remains constant at 1
2
 ¹ Since  = 0 at  = ¹ the
pivot point is at:
 = ~ ´ 
2(1 +  + )
=
1
2
¹ =  ~ (37)
The pivot point is thus where  = ~ = ~ as de…ned by (34). Substituting (37)
back into (36) to eliminate , the curve that connects all these pivot points is the envelope
curve  () that gives the maximum value of  for a given level of :
 () =
2
4(1 + + )2
(38)
Figure 4 shows the envelope curve  () for  =  = 1  = 4.
Figure 5 shows total emissions  from (29) as a function of the tax rate for  =  =
1  = 4 and di¤erent values of  (with the axes interchanged compared to Figure 4).
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Figure 5: Emissions as a function of the tax rate for di¤erent  values ( =  = 1  = 4)
For the  values of 1
10
and 1
4
, second order condition (30) for pro…t maximization does not
hold when the tax rate is very high, so that (29) results in negative pro…ts. The curves
for these  values are only shown for  values where pro…ts are positive. For the  values
of 1
15
and 20 however, pro…ts are positive throughout.
When    =
1
6
by (33) (that is, under low pro…tability conditions)  is monotoni-
cally decreasing in  and  is U-shaped in  reaching its minimum at  = ~ given by (34).
As we have seen above, this is where the  curves cross. In Figure 5, the point
where  reaches its minimum is where the emissions curve touches the  = ~ curve. The
 = ~ curve is the inverse of the  () curve in (38) and Figure 4.
When    =
1
6
by (33) (that is, under high pro…tability conditions)  is monotoni-
cally decreasing in  and  is U-shaped in  reaching its minimum at  = 1
2
 Solving  = 1
2
for  and substituting this into the expression for  in (29) we …nd that the point where
20
 reaches its minimum is given by:
 =
(2¡ )
4(1 + + )
This is the line " = 1
2
" in Figure 5. The emission curves for    feature decreasing
 above the  = 1
2
line and increasing  below it.
5 Discussion
In Section 3 we saw that with integrated technologies when the environmental policy is
very lenient, …rms respond to increases in the emission tax rate by both reducing output
and using cleaner production methods. However, after a certain level of policy strictness,
either output or emission intensity will increase following an increase in the emission tax
rate. After imposing more structure to the model in Section 4, we have been able to
shed light on the circumstances under which either of these will apply. In particular, we
have shown that with low pro…tability conditions, output is decreasing in the strictness of
the policy while emission intensity is U-shaped, while the opposite occurs when there are
high pro…tability conditions. This applies both when the product price is constant and
when …rms interact strategically in the output market. Higher pro…tability conditions
imply lower abatement and production costs, as well as higher output price for the case
without strategic interaction or larger market sizes and lower number of …rms for the case
of strategic interaction.
In the context of technology adoption, Perino and Requate (2012) …nd that the share
of …rms adopting a clean technology is inverted U-shaped in the strictness of environmen-
tal policy. In their paper, …rms face a discrete choice of technology and a constant product
price. In our model, keeping the constant product price assumption as in Perino and Re-
quate (2012), we show that individual emission intensities may be decreasing throughout
in the strictness of the policy, in which case output is U-shaped. Hence, we can state
that this result is not due to our explicit modelling of the output market, but because
we consider the case where the abatement choice is continuous, while they assume a dis-
crete choice between two alternative technologies. Qualitatively similar results to those
in Perino and Requate (2012) can be found in Bréchet and Meunier (2014). In the latter
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paper, …rms also face a discrete choice of integrated technology, but the output market
is explicitly modelled. The comparison to Bréchet and Meunier (2014) serves to further
make our point. The scenario where output is U-shaped while emission-to-output ratios
are decreasing in the strictness of the policy which emerges in our paper is not the result
of the modelling of the output market; rather, it is due to the abatement choice being
continuous rather than discrete.
The reader may wonder whether the non-monotonic e¤ects of the strictness of the
policy emerge because of policy failure. We address this issue in Appendix A where we
analyze the social optimum. We see that the e¤ects of environmental policy strictness
are qualitatively the same as with emission taxation (whether under strategic interaction
or constant price). Again there are two scenarios, one in which the environmental dam-
age parameter  has a non-monotonic e¤ect on output but emission-to-output ratios are
strictly decreasing in  and a second scenario where the opposite applies. The analysis
presented in the appendix also allows us to show that emission taxation alone can im-
plement the welfare optimum under both perfect competition and constant price. Under
Cournot oligopoly, however, a single instrument is not su¢cient to deal with the two
market failures of negative externalities and underproduction. Our analysis in Appendix
A therefore shows that the non-monotonic e¤ects of the strictness of the policy are not
the result of policy failure.
6 Conclusion
Does an increasingly strict environmental policy spur on the polluting industry to employ
ever cleaner production methods and lower production? The answer might appear obvious
at …rst sight but it is not, as it depends on the type of technology available to …rms. We
have shown that with an integrated abatement technology where …rms face a continuous
choice in terms of emission intensity, making environmental policy stricter leads to non-
monotonic responses by …rms in either output levels or emission intensities. Tightening
environmental policy induces …rms to reduce both their levels of output and emission
levels when the the policy is not very stringent to start with. However, when the policy
is su¢ciently strict, either output or the emissions-to-output ratio will turn increasing
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in the strictness of the policy. This applies both when emissions are taxed in a range of
market settings (whether …rms interact strategically or not), and in the welfare optimum.
Thus if we see polluting output increasing or production methods becoming less clean
as environmental policy becomes stricter, this is not necessarily a sign that the policy is
ine¤ective (or even counterproductive) or misguided.
With an integrated technology, a cleaner production method pivots the Marginal
Abatement Cost () curve clockwise, with the new  curve intersecting the old
one. We …nd that when emission intensity is U-shaped, the turning point occurs where
the  curves cross. When the product price is constant, the de…nition of  is
relatively straightforward: It is a …rm’s decrease in pro…ts from reducing emissions by
reducing output. When the product price is decreasing in total output, however, a …rm’s
pro…ts and thus its  depend on the output decisions of the other …rms. In this set-
ting, we de…ne the industry’s Aggregate  for the case where all …rms set the same
emission intensity and output levels. For the welfare-maximizing outcome, the relevant
concept is the Social , which includes the changes in the industry’s pro…ts and in
consumer surplus.
One might worry that when a cleaner technology shifts the  curve upwards for
low levels of emissions, the regulator’s response to the arrival of a cleaner technology
would perversely result in higher emissions (Bauman et al., 2008, p. 517). This does not
happen in our model where technology is endogenous to environmental policy. First, it
could be that the emission path never reaches the "perverse response" range. In this case,
emission intensity keeps decreasing in the strictness of environmental policy, and output is
U-shaped. The other possibility is that emissions do reach the perverse response range. In
this case the industry’s response to stricter environmental policy is to use a more polluting
technology and to reduce output.
Emission intensity is more likely to be U-shaped if the pro…tability conditions are low;
that is, if production and abatement costs and the number of …rms are large relatively
to the size of the market. This dichotomy draws our attention to the potential e¤ects of
the interaction between environmental and industrial policy. For example, policies aimed
at reducing entry barriers, combined with a stricter environmental policy, could result
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in lower abatement incentives. An increase in the number of …rms and a simultaneous
increase in the strictness of environmental policy could imply a switch from our U-shape
in output scenario to the U-shape in emission-to-output ratio scenario, resulting in an
increase in emission intensities across the industry. This could have ambiguous e¤ects on
welfare.
Endogenous entry is best understood in a model of heterogeneous …rms, such as the
Melitz (2003) model of monopolistic competition. Using this model, Cao et al. (2016)
…nd there can be an inverted U-shaped relation between …rm productivity and abatement
investment under certain conditions. They also …nd empirical support for this relation. In
our model, …rm heterogeneity could imply that some …rms face a U-shape in output while
others have U-shaped emissions intensity. Further research on these issues considering
endogenous entry and …rm heterogeneity would therefore be welcome.
It should be noted that we have used a partial equilibrium framework to derive our
result that output (emission intensity) is U-shaped in strictness under high (low) prof-
itability conditions. In a general equilibrium framework, a reduction in the consumption
of one polluting good will increase the demand for substitute goods. Since an increase
in demand will raise the pro…tability of producing these substitute goods, they are then
more likely to exhibit a U-shape in output rather than in emission intensity.
Although it may be optimal for environmental policy, especially climate change policy,
to become ever stricter over time, it is likely that policy makers are unable to credibly
commit to this. An alternative could be to stimulate environmental R&D, reducing the
future cost of stricter environmental policy by reducing marginal abatement costs (Abrego
and Perroni, 2002; Golombek et al., 2010). However, as we have seen, higher investment
into integrated technologies does not reduce the  curve for all emission levels, but
pivots it clockwise. Indeed, it is not clear that ever cleaner production methods are needed
for further and further reductions in emissions. This highlights a potential limitation of
environmental R&D subsidies in overcoming the commitment problem.
Ulph and Ulph (2013) found that an environmental R&D subsidy for an integrated
technology can be useful in dealing with a di¤erent commitment problem. The authors
show that a government that faces uncertainty about the environmental preferences of
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a future government may want the …rm to adopt a cleaner production technology. Ap-
plying the analysis of the present paper, we know that a cleaner production technology
comes with a steeper  curve. Thus with the cleaner technology in place, the future
government will implement an emission level that is closer to the current government’s
preferred level.
Our …ndings also have implications for empirical research. We …nd that the cleanliness
of production is a far from perfect indicator of the strictness of the environmental policy.
It may well be the case that stricter environmental policy will lead to less clean production.
This has implications for empirical studies which have used the emission-to-output ratio
as a proxy for the stringency of environmental policy. For instance, List and Co (2000)
use the ratio of pollution abatement operating expenditures to value added as one of the
measures of US state environmental regulation. Ederington et al. (2005) take the ratio
of pollution abatement costs to total costs of materials as their measure of stringency of
US (federal) environmental regulation.
In future empirical work, it would be interesting to examine whether abatement tech-
nology for a speci…c pollutant and industry can be described as an integrated technology.
In this case, further investigation could reveal whether stricter environmental policy would
lead, or perhaps has already led, to a U-shaped response in output or emission intensity.
Another avenue for potential research would be to study the interaction between industrial
policy and environmental policy instruments, as discussed above.
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A Appendix A: Welfare optimum and perfect com-
petition
The objective of this section is twofold. First, to show that the non-monotonic behavior of
the emission-to-output ratio or output is not due to market or policy failure. To this end,
we will solve the welfare optimum , where output and abatement are set to maximize
welfare. Second, to analyze the case of perfect competition, where we will see that our
qualitative results from previous sections stand. In the case of perfect competition, we
will also show that emission taxation alone implements the welfare optimum (the same
applies to the case of constant price). As …rms are symmetric, we focus on the symmetric
outcome where  =  and  =  for all  = 1 ¢ ¢ ¢  
A.1 General analysis
With perfect competition, there is a continuum of …rms of mass  Each …rm takes the
product price  as given. In stage two of the game presented in Section 2, …rm  sets
the output level  and emission intensity  to maximize its pro…ts (5). The FOCs are,
respectively:
 ¡ 0()¡  = 0 (A1)
¡ 0()¡  = 0 (A2)
The Hessian matrix is:
¦ =
µ ¡00 ¡
¡ ¡ 00
¶
Note that 00  0  00  0. Therefore, in this case, ¦ is negative de…nite as long as:
00 00 ¡ 2  0 (A3)
which is therefore the su¢cient SOC for maximization in this case.
Now let us move to welfare maximization. The …rst order conditions for maximizing
welfare (4) are:
 =  [ ¡ 0()¡ ] = 0 (A4)
 = ¡ [ 0() + ] = 0 (A5)
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A comparison of (A4) and (A5) with (6), (7), (A1) and (A2) shows that with constant
 and with perfect competition, the regulator can implement the welfare optimum by
setting the emission tax rate  =  Under Cournot oligopoly, however, setting  = 
does not implement the welfare optimum, because of the underproduction characterizing
imperfectly competitive markets. The regulator would therefore need an additional policy
instrument to implement the welfare optimum in this case.
Going back to the social optimum, if there is no environmental damage ( = 0 so that
 = 0), then from (A4) and (A5)  = 0 so that  = 1 and the welfare-maximizing
output level is ¹ implicitly de…ned by:
 (¹)¡ 0(¹) = 0 (A6)
The su¢cient SOC for welfare maximization is that the matrix
W = 
µ
 0 ¡ 00 ¡ 2 ¡ ¡ 
¡ ¡  ¡ 00 ¡ 2
¶
(A7)
is negative de…nite.21 This implies that hWh0  0 for all vectors h and the determinant
is positive, so that:
¢ ´
 ¡ 2
2
(A8)
= ¡ £ 0 ¡ 00 ¡ 2¤ £ 00 + 2¤ ¡ ( + )2  0
Totally di¤erentiating (A4) and (A5) with respect to  yields, using (A7):


=
 [ ¡ ]
 ¡ 2
=

¢
[ ¡  00] (A9)


=
 [ ¡ ]
 ¡ 2
=

¢
[ ( 0 ¡ 00) + ] (A10)
Note that   0 and ¢  0 by (A8). Thus the sign of (A9) and (A10) as well as
of (A11) and (A12) below is the sign of the term in square brackets. We cannot sign (A9)
and (A10) unambiguously, but we can do so for the case where environmental damage is
very high, so that emissions are very low:  =  ! 0. This means that either  or  or
both must be close to zero.
21Since  0 · 0 and   0 the condition 00 ¸ 0 would be su¢cient for  0 ¡ 00 ¡ 2  0
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When  is close to zero, the term in square brackets on the RHS of (A9) is positive,
so that output is increasing in the severity of environmental damage as  falls to a very
low level. Indeed, from (A4) with  ! 0  approaches the output level ¹ without
environmental damage, as de…ned by (A6).
When  is close to zero, the term in square brackets on the RHS of (A10) is positive, so
that the emissions-to-output ratio is increasing in the severity of environmental damage
as output falls to a very low level. Indeed, from (A5) with  ! 0  approaches unity
again: the …rm does not spend anything on reducing its emission intensity.
We can also use (A9) and (A10) along with (2) to show that emissions are decreasing
in :


= 


+ 


=

¢
£
2 ¡ 2 + 2
¤
 0 (A11)
The term in square brackets is negative from setting h =
¡
 ¡ ¢ in hWh0  0
which holds by negative de…niteness of W in (A7).
We can also show that marginal environmental damage  ´  is increasing in :


=  +


=

¢
£©
00 00 ¡2
ª ¡  0 00¤  0 (A12)
The second equality follows from (A8) and (A11). The term in square brackets is
positive, because  0 · 0 00  0 and the term in curly brackets is positive. The latter
term is second order condition (A3) for perfect competition which implements the welfare
optimum with  = 
Finally, let us return to perfect competition. Inequality (A12) together with our
…nding that setting  =  implements the welfare optimum means that under perfect
competition,  and  have the same signs as  in (A9) and  in (A10)
respectively, and   0 by (A11).
Summarizing our …ndings, we have:
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Proposition 2 When …rms have access to an integrated abatement technology with a
continuous range of emission intensities :
1. In the constant-price and perfect competition scenarios, setting the emission tax rate
equal to marginal damage  ´  implements the welfare optimum. An emission
tax alone cannot implement the social optimum in Cournot oligopoly.
In the welfare optimum:
2. Emissions  are decreasing and  is increasing in the environmental damage
parameter ;
3. When  is very low, both output  and emission intensity  are decreasing in ;
4. When  is very high so that  is close to zero:
(a) When  is close to zero,  is increasing in 
(b) When  is close to zero,  is increasing in 
As before, we will conduct further analysis on speci…c integrated technology to estab-
lish the behavior of output and emission intensity for any level of environmental damage,
and the conditions under which either is non-monotonic.
A.2 Example
Here we investigate the welfare optimum  with the speci…c functions (15) for cost and
(16) for demand. By Proposition 2.1, the analysis also applies to perfect competition.
In a symmetric outcome, welfare (4) is  =  where, from (15) and (16):
 =
³
¡ 
2

´
 ¡ 
2
2 ¡ 1
2
(1¡ )2 ¡ ()

(A13)
The …rst order conditions are:


= ¡  ¡  ¡  = 0 (A14)


= (1¡ )¡  = 0 (A15)
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with marginal damage  ´ ()
Without environmental damage ( = 0 so  = = 0) the welfare optimum is:
 =  ´

+ 
  =   = ´
2
2(+ )
(A16)
Note that it su¢ces to solve for  and  as functions of  rather than  because
we know from Proposition 2.2 that  is increasing in  This also implies we do not
need to use a speci…c functional form for the environmental damage function ()
Solving (A14) and (A15) for   and  as functions of  yields:22
 =
 (¡)
(+ )¡2   =
(+ )¡ 
(+ )¡2   =
 [¡] [(+ )¡ ]
[(+ )¡2]2
(A17)
Applying Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 from Appendix B, we see that when   2(+
) emission intensity is monotonically decreasing in  and output is U-shaped in 
with the turning point at  = 1
2
 Intuitively, output is initially declining in the marginal
damage. When production is very clean however (to be precise: when the emissions-to-
output ratio is below half the no-regulation level), the level of output can increase again
with marginal damage while production is becoming ever cleaner.
When   2(+) output is monotonically decreasing in and emission intensity
is U-shaped in  with the turning point at
~ ´ 
2
=

2(+ )
(A18)
Thus,  decreases until the point where output is so low that it is no longer worthwhile
to further clean up production. This point is where output is at half its no-regulation
level of  given in (A16).
The signi…cance of the comparison between  and 2( + ) can be explained as
follows. When  is high, demand is high, so that the regulator does not want to reduce
output by too much and is anxious to increase it again if possible. When  and  are high,
the cost of reducing emission intensity per …rm  and for all …rms  is high. Then the
regulator does not want to spend too much on reducing emission intensity and is happy to
22The numerators on the RHS of the  and  equations are the equivalent of second order condition
(A3) for perfect competition. They are positive by Proposition 3.3 in Appendix B.
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Figure 6: Social Marginal Abatement Cost (SMAC) curves for di¤erent emission intensi-
ties  ( =  = 1  = 4)
increase emission intensity again if possible. Finally when  is high, production is costly,
again making emission reduction more socially e¢cient than increasing output.
The interpretation in terms of marginal abatement cost depends on whether we apply
the analysis to the welfare optimum directly or to perfect competition. With perfect
competition, we can follow the discussion and analysis in subsection 4.1 to write a …rm’s
marginal abatement costs as (23). By (2) and (16), this becomes:
( ) =


¡ 
2
=


¡ (+ )

We can then interpret the outcome as each …rm setting  =  =
Returning to the welfare optimum, it is useful to de…ne the social marginal abatement
cost () as a function of total emissions  =  divided equally among all …rms.
Substituting (2) into (A13), welfare  =  can be written as a function of  and :
 ( ) =  ¡ 
2
(1¡ )2 ¡() (A19)
34
with pollution bene…ts  the di¤erence between the utility and the production cost of
output:
 ´
µ
¡ 
2
¶


¡ 
2
µ


¶2
(A20)
Maximizing (A19) with respect to  shows that social marginal abatement cost23
() should equal marginal damage ():
 ´ 

=


¡ (+ )
2
= (A21)
When there is no environmental damage ( = 0 so that = 0) the welfare optimum
has  = 0 in (A21), so that  =   =  ´  and  =  ´  with
 and  given by (A16) and  by (A20). Unless  = 0  = 0 can only be achieved
by setting  = 0 which implies  = 0 A decrease in  shifts the point  ´  where
 = 0 to the left. The area under the  curve must remain the same, because
it is the di¤erence  in pollution bene…ts between  = 0 and  =  = 0. This
means that by (A16), (0) has to move up according to:
(0) =
2

=


Figure 6 shows  curves for di¤erent levels of  when  =  = 1  = 4
When  falls marginally, the  curve pivots clockwise around its middle point,
so that the area underneath remains constant at  Since  = 0 at  = ¹ the
pivot point is at:
 = ~ ´ 
2(+ )
=
1
2
¹ =  ~ (A22)
The pivot point is thus where  = ~ de…ned by (A16). Substituting (A22) back into
(A21) to eliminate , the curve that connects all these pivot points for di¤erent  values
is the envelope curve  () that gives the maximum value of  for a given :
 () =
2
4 (+ )
(A23)
Figure 6 shows the envelope curve  () for  =  = 1  = 4.
Figure 7 shows emissions (A17) as a function of marginal damage  in the optimum
for  =  = 1  = 4 and di¤erent values of  (note that the axes are interchanged
23Whereas marginal abatement costs are usually de…ned in terms of a single …rm’s pro…ts, our de…nition
of social marginal abatement costs emcompasses all the …rms’ pro…ts as well as the consumer surplus.
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Figure 7: Industry emissions as a function of marginal damage in the welfare optimum
for di¤erent values of  ( =  = 1  = 4)
compared to Figure 6). When   2( + ) = 15  is monotonically decreasing in
 and  is U-shaped in  reaching its minimum at  = ~ given by (22). As we
have seen above, this is where the  curves cross. In Figure 7, the point where 
reaches its minimum is where the emissions curve touches the  = ~ curve. This curve
is the inverse of the  () curve in (A23) and Figure 6.
When   2(+ ) = 15  is monotonically decreasing in  and  is U-shaped
in  reaching its minimum at  = 1
2
 Solving  = 1
2
for  and substituting this into the
expression for  in (A17) the point where  reaches its minimum is given by:
 =
 (2¡)
4(+ )
This is the line " = 1
2
" in Figure 7. The emission curves for   2( + ) = 15
feature decreasing  above the  = 1
2
line and increasing  below it.
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B Appendix B: Example
Lemma 1 Let each …rm’s cost function be given by (15) and its emissions by (2). Then
under emission taxation with a constant product price (scenario ) and with Cournot
oligopoly (scenario ) as well as in the welfare optimum , the solution has the form:
 =
(¤¡  )
£¡  2   =
£¡ ¤
£¡  2   =
(¤¡  ) (£¡ ¤ )
(£¡  2)2 (B1)
where:
 =  ¤ =  £ =  (B2)
 =  ¤ =  £ = 1 + +  (B3)
 =  ¤ =  £ = +  (B4)
so that  = 0 implies:
 = ¹ ´ ¤
£
(B5)
Proof. Equation (B1) follows from substituting (B2) into (20) in scenario , (B3) into
(29) in scenario  and (B4) into (A17) in scenario 
We can now state:24
Proposition 3 In the general solution:
1. If   ¤2£ then   0 for all   0; and 

=

0 for 

=

1
2
 When
 = £¤  = 0 with  = 0 and  = ¹ given by (B5).
2. If   ¤2£ then   0 for all   0; and 

=

0 for 

=

~ with:
~ ´ ¤
2£
(B6)
When  = ¤  = 0 with  = 0 and  = 1
3. Whether   ¤2£ or   ¤2£:
£¡  2  0 (B7)
24Due to space constraints, we omit the formal analysis of the knife-edge case  = ¤2£ In this case,
  0 and   0 for low  values until  = 12 and  = ~ given by (B6). For higher  values
there are two solutions, one with   0 and   0 and one with   0 and   0
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Proof. Di¤erentiating  and  in (B1) with respect to  yields:


=
 [ (2¤¡  )¡ £]
(£¡  2)2 =
 [1¡ 2]
£¡  2 (B8)


=
2£ ¡ ¤(£+  2)
(£¡  2)2 =
2£(~ ¡ )
£¡  2 (B9)
The second equality in (B8) follows from (B1). The second equality in (B9) follows
from (B1) and (B6).
Emissions drop to zero either because  = 0 which from (B1) happens at  = ¤ or
because  = 0 which from (B1) happens at  = £¤
1. If   ¤2£  = 0 when  = £¤ so that by (B1),  = 0 and  = ¹ given by
(B5) For the numerator of the fraction in the middle of (B9), ¤2  £ implies:
2£ ¡ ¤(£+  2)  ¡
p
£
³
 ¡
p
£
´2
 0
With  falling monotonically from 1 to zero, (B8) implies that 

=

0 for 

=

1
2

2. If   ¤2£  = 0 when  = ¤ so that  = 0 and  = 1 by (B1) For the term in
square brackets in the middle of (B8), ¤2  £ implies:
 (2¤¡  )¡ £  ¡( ¡ ¤)2  0
With  in (B1) decreasing monotonically from ¹  ~ (by (B5) and (B6)) to zero,
(B9) implies that 

=

0 for 

=

~
3. Condition (B7) is always met for   ¤2£ since
£¡  2  £¡
µ
£
¤
¶2
= £
µ
1¡ £
¤2
¶
 0
Condition (B7) is also met for   ¤2£ since £  ¤2   2.
38
C Appendix C: Comparison with Ulph (1997)
In this appendix we reconcile our …ndings in Section 3 with Ulph (1997). We …nd that with
integrated technology, output  is decreasing in the emission tax rate  for low values of 
(Proposition 1.3) and can be increasing in  for high  (Proposition 1.4) By contrast, Ulph
(1997, p. 49) lists integrated technology cost functions where  is constant or increasing
monotonically in 
According to Ulph (1997),  is constant when ( ) = 0¡  or inverting the function
and normalizing 0 = 1:
 () = ¡ 1

ln   0() = ¡ 1

(C1)
Substituting (C1) into (6) and (7), we …nd that the two FOCs are satis…ed with
equality if and only if  is constant at ¤  ¹ implicitly de…ned by:
 (¤) +  0(¤)¤ ¡ 0(¤)¡ 1
¤
= 0 (C2)
so that  is given by:
1

¡ ¤ = 0 (C3)
However since  · 1, (C2) and (C3) can only be satis…ed for:
 ¸ ¤ ´ 1
¤
(C4)
and  · ¤ The regulator can achieve a total emission level  2 (¤ ¹) by setting
  ¤ to which the …rm will respond by not abating, so that  = 1 and (C3) does not
hold (McKitrick, 1999) and setting  according to:
 +  0() ¡ 0()¡  = 0
We do not allow for integrated technology cost function (C1) in our model, because it
features  0(1) = ¡1  0 which violates our assumption  0(1) = 0.
According to Ulph (1997),  is increasing in  when ( ) = 0(1¡ 12 )2, or inverting
the function and normalizing 0 = 1:
 () =
2 (1¡ p)

This function also has  0(1) = ¡1  0 again violating our assumption  0(1) = 0.
Then for 0    ¤ with ¤ again de…ned by (C4) and (C2), the …rm will respond to
a higher tax rate by decreasing its output and keeping  at 1. For   ¤ the …rm will
reduce  and raise 
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